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THIS ARTICLE SEEKS TO ANSWER a fundamental antitrust question: does crimepay? In other words, do the current overall lev-els of U.S. cartel sanctions (including civil dam-ages) adequately discourage firms from engag-
ing in illegal collusion? Seven years ago,1 the unfortunate
answer was plainly, “Criminal cartels usually pay!” The sum
of expected costs (in criminal penalties, civil damages, and
other cartel-related expenses) was significantly less than the
sum of expected gains to the company and the individual
decision-makers. Sadly, the most recent data re-affirm this
conclusion.
Why does crime pay, and what can be done to reduce or
eliminate that profitability? Answering these questions
requires an understanding of the legal-economic theory of
optimal deterrence and the basic psychology of cartelists.
Empirical data can be used to determine the optimality of the
actual level of currently-imposed cartel sanctions. Indeed,
there is an extensive literature on overall median and mean of
the average2 levels of cartel overcharge rates, as well as our
own study comparing the actual levels of overcharges by 75
cartels with the actual levels of cartel sanctions imposed in
these cases.3 Our analysis shows that current cartel sanctions
are far too low, and that optimal penalties should be increased
fivefold. Even if this optimal level cannot be reached, we
propose five specific steps that, together, would substantial-
ly reduce the billions of dollars that consumers and businesses
pay each year in cartel overcharges.
Economics, Cartelists’ Psychology, and 
Optimal Deterrence
Suppose you were the head of the widget division at a large
company, that your division’s profits were down, and that
you were at risk of being fired. Would you consider fixing
prices? Sure, your company has a compliance program
installed by a reputable law firm that urges you never to fix
prices and warns you about getting caught and going to
prison—in fact, you heard these same things at your old
company. But throughout your career you have succeeded
because you were a risk taker—and you know that you are
much smarter than the idiots who fixed prices and got
caught. Surely you could figure out how to raise your divi-
sion’s profitability by several times its historical earnings,
with at most only a small risk of getting caught and convict-
ed. After all, price fixing is extremely difficult to prove unless
someone is foolish enough to write down what they are
doing.
The Standard Model. How should the legal system help
keep you from succumbing to this temptation to advance
your career through undetected price fixing? The standard
model of optimal deterrence—originated by Nobel Laureate
Gary Becker4 and refined by leading legal-economic scholars
over the last four decades5—assumes that potential cartelists
very roughly assess the expected costs of and rewards from
collusion and that they also consider in a rough fashion the
risks of apprehension and conviction.6 The optimal deter-
rence approach also assumes that the decision makers are
risk-neutral and that they and their companies have the same
incentives.7 Under this approach, if the expected sanctions are
larger than the expected rewards, the illegal behavior would
be deterred.8
Problems with the Standard Model. Unfortunately,
most of the assumptions and implicit conditions underlying
the standard optimal deterrence model are questionable or
unverifiable. We cannot determine with certainty either the
optimal sanctions floor (below which the penalties under-
deter) or ceiling (above which the penalties deter pro-com-
petitive conduct). For example, it seems impossible that many
would-be cartelists would have more than a vague notion of
the information needed to perform the analysis. The antitrust
field knows very little—in general and especially for each
category or individual case of potential price fixing—about
what the individual decision makers and their companies as
a whole expect their rewards from price fixing to be, how like-
ly they believe they are to be caught, and what they expect
will happen if they are caught.9 But their antitrust counsel can
help fill in the missing information at least very roughly—
that is, enough so the decision makers know that price fixing
is a serious crime with serious potential penalties. In short, we
use the standard optimal deterrence approach—a general
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deterrence approach—because we have no empirical reason
to believe that it is biased or seriously wrong (or, perhaps
more importantly, that a better approach exists). 
By analogy, we know a great deal about competitive mar-
kets and even about how monopolies are likely to behave. But
cartels? Almost anything is possible, depending upon a large
number of alternative market-structure or participant-behav-
ior assumptions that might apply to a particular market of
interest.10 Similarly, deviating from the standard optimal
deterrence approach could markedly influence a determina-
tion of the appropriate level of cartel sanctions. For example,
we could plausibly posit that would-be cartelists are extreme
risk seekers and that the sanctions necessary to prevent them
from attempting to form a cartel, or to defect from existing
cartels, should be much higher than those calculated using
the standard risk-neutral approach. Conversely, we could
posit that cartelists are often ready and willing to turn state’s
evidence on their fellow cartelists (and thereby escape prison,
although not the inevitable private treble damage suits).11 If
this were often true, then significantly lower sanctions could
suffice to dissolve, although not to prevent, cartels.12
We could ask other questions about the upper end of the
required sanction range: at what sanction level does over-
deterrence become plausible or likely? As an extreme exam-
ple, the death penalty for cartelization surely would lead
honest businesspeople to refrain from engaging in procom-
petitive conduct. More realistically, is there any reason to
believe that the sanctions calculated using the standard
approach would lead to over-deterrence? Even if a large per-
centage of cartelists are eager to turn in their fellow cartelists,
couldn’t these additional sanctions be unnecessary but harm-
less? 
Practical Optimality of Standard Model. Since we do
not know the amount by which sanctions could be less than
the optimal amount and still dissolve most cartels promptly
and effectively, and since there is no reason to believe that
honest business people commonly are, for example, forgoing
procompetitive joint ventures that are often mistaken for
price fixing, we believe that the levels of sanctions calculated
using the standard optimal deterrence approach are optimal.
Although it is easy to posit theoretical considerations that cut
in a variety of directions, we know of no empirical data sug-
gesting any reason to deviate from the standard optimal
deterrence approach. And, although theoretical possibilities
cut in offsetting directions, we know of no empirical reason
to believe that standard optimal deterrence approach on the
whole is biased in any direction.
General vs. Specific Deterrence
Why should highways have specific speed limits, and speci-
fied fines for specified violation of speed limits? Why not in
each case instead calculate the actual damages—if any—
caused by that speeder, and then adjust the possible sanction
by a multiplier that took into account the probability the spe-
cific speeder would be detected and convicted? Moreover, if
a speeder did not actually hit anyone or anything, or they
could demonstrate that their ex ante probability of causing
any damage was very low and so their decision to speed was
reasonable, why shouldn’t we accept their argument that
they should only receive a token speeding ticket, or none at
all?
These questions help explain why the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines for antitrust violations are framed in terms of
general deterrence (i.e., deterrence directed generally at firms
considering price fixing) instead of specific deterrence (i.e.,
deterrence that focuses on the motivations and effects of
each specific party that fixed prices).13 A specific deterrence
approach would require considering a host of factors relevant
to each cartel. Although this fact-intensive analysis (or at
least the economists’ part) would be technically feasible,14 it
would be very poor public policy. The process would quick-
ly become expensive, overly subjective, non-transparent, and
unpredictable, and it would be a drain on judicial resources.
One could imagine, for example, testimony from competing
psychologists about risk-seeking or risk-aversion personalities,
competing game theory experts explaining the Prisoners’
Dilem ma and the relative likelihood of any participant’s
informing on their fellow cartelists, and self-serving and
unverifiable testimony from the colluding executives about
their own states of mind. Testimony about overdeterrence
issues would be similarly complicated. In short, a specific
deterrence approach would add dramatically to the com-
plexity and cost of litigation and enforcement. Without a
commensurate budget increase, the DOJ would be forced to
make different choices as to which cases to litigate and which
to settle (or not even bring). 
More fundamentally, an individualistic process would be
much less likely to deter cartels effectively because it would no
longer send an even somewhat clear signal to would-be
cartelists about the costs and risks of their contemplated
behavior. Society’s primary purpose in prohibiting cartels and
cartelists is not to punish the lawbreakers, or even to deprive
them of their ill-gotten gains.15 Rather, the primary goal is to
deter future crimes. Antitrust enforcement can only do this by
establishing a clear system of sanctions, one that is relatively
predictable and is based upon the best available information.
Given the broad consensus that horizontal collusion is the
“supreme evil of antitrust,”16 the legal system’s single-clearest
signal to businesspeople should be: “Don’t collude. Don’t fix
prices. If you do, the costs will exceed the gains.”
Economic Framework for Optimal Penalties
The optimal penalty for collusion is the expected losses
caused by the illegal conduct (which is roughly equal to the
overcharges paid by the cartel’s direct customers) divided by
the cartelists’ expected probability of being detected and
punished.17 Other measures—such as focusing on the cartel’s
expected gains—are usually considered less likely to lead to
optimal deterrence. Even this simplified description of the
optimal penalty makes a great many conventional assump-
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tions (including that cartelists are risk neutral and rational
calculating profit maximizers).18
Probability of Detection and Conviction. One of the
variables in the optimal penalty calculation is the probabili-
ty of detection and conviction (more precisely, the cartelists’
perception of those probabilities). Many sources place the
actual probability of detecting hidden cartels at 10 percent to
30 percent,19 and the chance of conviction at above 90 per-
cent.20 To be conservative about the size of optimal penalties,
we will assume in our analysis a 25 percent to 30 percent
probability that hidden cartels will be discovered and con-
victed. If cartelists on the whole are risk seekers, however,
then this formula will understate the optimal penalties. 
Penalties. Optimal-deterrence principles require consid-
eration of harm to victims, and the penalties must be rela-
tively measurable. There are three penalties for which fairly
precise money metrics are publicly available:
(1) Fines imposed by U.S. courts on both companies and
on individuals. Since this article is concerned only with effects
within the United States, we consider only fines based on
U.S. commerce.
(2) Settlements paid as a result of private damages suits in
the U.S. We have analyzed collusion cases for which these fig-
ures are in the public record and verifiable. These often can
be significant; in a sample of 71 U.S. cartel cases, the medi-
an average of the settlements was 37 percent of single dam-
ages and the unweighted mean average was 65 percent.21
(3) Disutility from imprisonment or house arrest for cul-
pable executives. After an extensive analysis of analogous sit-
uations, we assigned a (dis)value of $6 million per year of
imprisonment or house arrest.22
Costs Not Reflected in Penalties. There are other costs
of collusion that, as a practical matter, outsiders usually can-
not measure. These include: legal costs of defendants (which
only rarely are publicly disclosed); managerial costs of coor-
dination of the legal defense and of dealing with public/
investor relations and other corporate distractions;23 opt-out
settlements (which, if small individually, may not be publicly
disclosed—unlike large settlements that are material and
therefore disclosed in public filings, and unlike class settle-
ments that are disclosed in settlement-approval proceedings);
and reputational losses.24 If the measurable penalties are
smaller than the actual total penalties and costs associated
with collusion, then our computations will lead to an opti-
mal penalty higher than it needs to be. We believe, however,
that these non-measured costs of collusion are usually rela-
tively small and transitory compared to the three that we list
above, but we know no way of proving their relative magni-
tudes.25
On the other hand, cartels also cause damages that only
rarely can be measured and even more rarely be recouped by
victims. These harms include deadweight losses, umbrella
effects,26 and the time value of money. Deadweight losses (the
allocative inefficiency effects of cartel pricing) can reach up
to 50 percent of the overcharge, although our best estimate
is that these losses usually are only about 10 to 20 percent of
the overcharge.27 Because fines and payments to injured par-
ties usually are made many years after the collusive period
ended, all of these penalties ought to be restated in constant
dollars to reflect general inflation and the time value of
money. The victims lose the earnings that they could have
made on the money illegally confiscated by cartelists (who get
to keep such additional profits themselves). The adjustments
necessary to compensate for the absence of prejudgment
interest can be significant. We are unaware, however, of the
costs of deadweight losses, umbrella effects, or prejudgment
interest ever being awarded in an antitrust case.28 In short,
cartels inflict total harms on society that are larger than the
overcharges paid by direct purchasers.29
Measuring Cartel Overcharges. Generally speaking,
the median cartel overcharge is in the range of 18 to 25 per-
cent above the prices that would prevail if there were no
cartel. The median percentage overcharges of cartels that
ended their collusion between January 1990 and December
2018 are summarized, by type of cartel, in the top three
rows of Table 1.30 The third row summarizes 1,024 over-
charges of cartels ending during the years 1990–2018. The
“All Years” row summarizes 1,705 overcharges calculated for
every estimate available for the entire time period (the years
1700 to 2018). Using a median average overcharge figure
Table 1. Median Average Overcharges, by Period and Type
Membership Legal Status
Classic Price Buyers’
Cartel End Date National International Found Guilty Legal Bid Rigging Fixing Cartels ALL TYPES
Median percenta
1990–1999 16.65 25.00 24.60 20.75 19.00 24.90 22.05 24.00
2000–2018 24.00 20.00 20.00 27.50 17.05 24.00 17.00 20.10
1990–2018 20.70 22.50 22.20 25.60 17.95 24.25 16.90 22.30
ALL YEARS 18.30 25.00 22.00 27.50 18.30 25.00 18.10 23.00
Source: J.M. Connor, Price-Fixing Overcharges Master Data Set, a spreadsheet dated December 4, 2018. 
a) Medians of the point estimates or, where appropriate, of the midpoint of range estimates. Excludes hundreds of “peak” overcharge estimates that refer to max-
imal price effects over brief periods of time, rather than an entire, usually multi-year episode of collusion. Includes 93 zero estimates. 
tain the necessary data, using the methodology summarized
in the previous section.41 The overall results for a sample of
75 cartels42 show that on average the value of the imposed
U.S. sanctions has been much less than they should have been
for society to obtain optimal deterrence against cartelization.
If means of overcharge figures are used, the total value of the
imposed sanctions are only 16 to 21 percent of their optimal
level. If median figures are used, the imposed sanctions aver-
aged only 9 to 12 percent of optimality.43 We found only one
unusual cartel (out of the 75 for which we could assemble the
necessary information) for which the totality of sanctions
was possibly larger than optimal.44 A second cartel was prob-
ably optimally sanctioned.45 The other 73 cartels, however,
were sub-optimally sanctioned, and most of them substan-
tially under-sanctioned (half were sanctioned less than 10 per-
cent of optimality).46
But because so few cartels are detected, optimal deter-
rence of illegal collusion (and not just disgorgement of prof-
its in the particular case) is usually the primary goal of
antitrust enforcement. As noted, under the optimal deter-
rence approach, cartel sanctions should be slightly larger than
their “net harms to others” ÷ (the probability of detection x
the probability of conviction). From a deterrence perspective,
would-be cartelists are unlikely to form their expectations
about detection and possible penalties from outliers rather
than the norm. They are much more likely to be guided by
what happened on average to the vast majority of cartels that
affected the roughly $1 trillion in affected sales (about $2 tril-
lion in 2018 dollars) in the cases covered by our study.47
Furthermore (as discussed above), cartel sanctions should be
set for general deterrence purposes, not with a focus on par-
ticular cartels.
Disutility of Imprisonment. One of the more innova-
tive aspects of our analysis was the value that we assigned to
the deterrence effects of a year in prison or under house
arrest. We used $6 million as the average deterrence-equiva-
lent figure for both. We readily admit that other researchers
may develop alternative methods that could result in a dif-
ferent amount. While preliminary, our assigned value is not
arbitrary. 
To arrive at our estimate we analyzed five different meas-
ures of the value of time in prison, and believe that $6 mil-
lion is significantly more than the average a year of confine-
ment should be valued at.48 Nevertheless, one could argue
that we should be using a significantly higher figure, in light
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helps adjust for a high degree of statistical skewness in each
cell of Table 1. 
Several general patterns can be observed in the data. First,
international cartels tend to show larger overcharge rates
than purely domestic cartels.31 Second, “legal” cartels—many
of them operating openly (like registered export cartels)—
generally have slightly higher overcharges than clandestine
cartels that are later detected and punished. Third, bid-rig-
ging schemes and buyers’ cartels have distinctly lower over-
charges than classic price-fixing cartels. Fourth, the cartel’s
industry does not appear to be a significant explanatory vari-
able of the variations in overcharge percentages. Fifth, the
data source (courts or other sources) and the method of
analysis employed do not appear to have a significant effect
on overcharge percentages.32
The median overcharge for all types of cartels is 23 per-
cent.33 If one generously assumes a 25 to 30 percent chance
a cartel will be detected, then (all else being equal) the opti-
mal total penalties on cartels ought to be within the range of
55.5 to 110 percent of affected commerce, depending on
the type of cartel and time period being examined.34
Table 1 reports medians of the overcharge calculations,
not the more familiar mean of cartel overcharges. Mean over-
charges are invariably higher than medians because in every
category a few cartels overcharge by extremely large amounts.
The mean overcharge by domestic cartels up to 2013 was 35
percent, and the mean was 56 percent for international car-
tels. The overall figure was 49 percent.35 Which is the better
metric for enforcement policies aimed at optimal deterrence?
We do not know of a clear answer as to whether means or
medians are better.36
Which Is Larger? Cartel Profits or Cartel
Penalties? 37
A crude first step in assessing the deterrence power of sanc-
tions levied on cartels is to examine the disgorgement of car-
tel profits. This can be measured by “recovery ratios,” defined
as the ratio of all monetary penalties (including payouts in
private cases) imposed on members of a cartel, divided by the
best estimate of that cartel’s profits from collusion. If there is
full disgorgement of a cartel’s illegal profits, the recovery
ratio would be 100 percent. If the combined sanctions are
half of the supracompetitive profits, the recovery ratio would
be 50 percent.
Recovery Ratios and Sanctions. A study prepared for
the OECD calculated recovery ratios for scores of cartels
around the world for different data sets.38 The highest medi-
an average recovery ratios were 44 percent for global cartels
and less than half of that level for non-global cartels.39 As
noted above, for a sample of 71 U.S. cartel cases, the medi-
an average settlement (the recovery ratio) was 37 percent of
single damages and the unweighted mean was 65 percent of
single damages.40
We have undertaken such an empirical analysis for every
U.S.-sanctioned cartel for which we have been able to ascer-
But because so few car tels are detected, optimal
deter rence of i l legal col lusion (and not just 
disgorgement of prof its in the par t icular case) 
is usual ly the primar y goal of antitrust enforcement. 
S P R I N G  2 0 1 9  ·  3 3
Finally, the United States should implement a whistle-
blower reward or bounty system for individuals who turn in
cartels, and perhaps even for corporations.60 Bounty pro-
grams have the potential to enhance cartel detection and to
destabilize cartels even more than leniency and amnesty pro-
grams.61 The bounties could be introduced gradually, and ini-
tially could be limited to individuals. But if necessary, a
bounty might be awarded to corporations that turn in cartels,
even if they had once been a member of the cartel. Perhaps
amnesty recipients could be given 10 percent of other cartel
participants’ fines, and if 10 percent is insufficient, it could
be increased.62
Implementing these policy proposals would help to deter
illegal collusion without any significant risk of overdeter-
rence. Together, these proposals are very likely to save vic-
timized consumers and businesses from paying billions of
dollars per year in cartel overcharges. 
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landish $4.4 billion to $6.3 billion fine) to make collusion
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Policy Recommendations
The great majority of companies participating in illegal car-
tels make a profit even after they pay all the penalties. This
is true both for cartels that operate purely within the United
States and for international cartels.50 Since the current level
of sanctions is only 9 to 21 percent of optimality, it follows
that current overall sanction levels should be quintupled. To
move even modestly in this direction, we propose five specific
recommendations.51 Only the first and possibly the last
would require new legislation.
First, new legislation should add prejudgment interest to
both private treble damage actions and criminal fines.52 This
would increase the effective size of these sanctions substan-
tially,53 especially for durable cartels and for cartelists that use
delaying tactics during plea bargaining or litigation. Even
though any legislation that increased sanctions is likely to face
strong opposition, this change should be intuitively attractive
as reasonable to many people, including such antitrust stal-
warts as Judge Frank Easterbrook54 and retired Judge Richard
Posner.55
Second, the U.S. Sentencing Commission should double
its current presumption that cartels raise prices by an average
of 10 percent.56 This presumption is a key feature of the fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, which are the basis of nearly all
U.S. cartel fines. However, hundreds of independent esti-
mates show that the median cartel overcharge since 1990
has averaged 23 percent, the mean overcharge has been more
than 35 percent for domestic cartels, and 56 percent for
international cartels. Doubling the presumption would sub-
stantially improve deterrence.57
Third, the budget of the Antitrust Division should be
increased significantly, and this increase should be earmarked
for cartel enforcement. Enabling the Division to pursue more
investigations would surely permit it to detect and prove
more cartels.58
Fourth, as Judge Douglas Ginsburg and others have rec-
ommended, the DOJ should insist, in its plea bargaining
negotiations, on several provisions that would increase the
expected cost of cartel violations to corporate employees: the
corporate defendant must agree not to hire or re-hire anyone
who has been convicted of price fixing for a specified (and
long) period, should not pay the fines of their convicted
employees, and should not compensate them in any way for
serving time.59
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